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Abstract i 
Abstract 
Crowdfunding has experienced enormous growth in recent years, and the form of 
crowdfunding that has grown most is crowdlending. A key reason for this growth is that 
crowdlending has given small and medium enterprises easier access to capital. There are 
currently no common regulations for crowdlending in Europe, and the regulations for 
crowdlending in Norway and Sweden are different. However, the European Union has 
recently passed a common regulation which will make regulations more equal between the 
countries in the future.  
This thesis investigates whether there are differences in credit quality among companies that 
seek financing through crowdlending in Norway and Sweden. It also investigates if there are 
differences in credit risk premiums cross-border. The results from these analyses could 
provide insight into what will happen after the implementation of the common EU 
regulations.  
To analyze this, we construct a dataset containing information about companies that have 
received funding through Norwegian and Swedish crowdlending platforms from 2017 
through 2020. A range of OLS regression models are estimated to determine the relationship 
between credit quality and country of issuance and between credit risk premium and country 
of issuance. The empirical results demonstrate that the credit quality of companies receiving 
funding through Swedish crowdlending platforms has been significantly higher than for their 
Norwegian counterparts. They further show that credit risk premiums for loans issued 
through Swedish crowdlending platforms have been significantly higher than for loans 
issued through Norwegian platforms.  
We argue that the main reason explaining the relatively poorer credit quality in Norway than 
in Sweden is the current regulations. Specifically, we point to the peculiar Norwegian 
investment limit of NOK 1 million per year. Further, we argue that the relatively lower credit 
risk premiums in Norway constitutes an anomaly due to the same reason. 
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1. Introduction 
Crowdfunding is a form of financing that has experienced enormous growth in the last 
decade. In Europe, there was a compounded annual growth rate of 44% between 2015 and 
2018 (Ziegler et al., 2020). Norway and Sweden have experienced even higher growth, with 
compounded annual growth rates in the same period of 200% and 157%, respectively 
(Ziegler et al., 2019). One of the reasons for this growth is that crowdfunding has given 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) easier access to capital, which is one of the biggest 
challenges for these companies (European Union, 2020). This has been a problem for SMEs 
even in countries with stable access to bank finance throughout the financial crisis (European 
Union, 2020). Another potential reason for the growth may be the attractive return on capital 
for investors and the possibility to diversify portfolios with another asset class. 
The great emergence and importance of crowdfunding has also led to a debate about how to 
regulate the industry (European Crowdfunding Network, 2017). Regulation of crowdfunding 
entails which laws and rules that apply to the project owner receiving funding, the investors 
funding the project, and the crowdfunding platform acting as an intermediary. The 
regulations have been different among the various countries in Europe, where some 
countries have implemented a special Act for crowdfunding, while other countries have not 
(European Crowdfunding Network, 2017).  
As there have been no common regulations for crowdfunding in Europe, Norway and 
Sweden have different regulations. Industry players have encountered challenges around 
stricter restrictions in Norway than in Sweden (Kameo, 2019). For further growth in the 
crowdfunding industry in Europe, the European Union wants to facilitate cross-border 
investing and the provision of crowdfunding services (European Union, 2020). As a result, 
the European Union created a common set of rules for all member states that will enter into 
force in November 2021 (European Union, 2020). These regulations are much more similar 
to the current Swedish regulations than the Norwegian regulations. The Norwegian 
regulations will thus become more similar to the current Swedish regulations.  
The fact that Norwegian regulations will converge towards Swedish regulations makes it 
interesting to assess differences between the markets, as this could provide insights on what 
to expect in Norway. Among the different segments within crowdfunding, the lending-based 
segment has the highest market volume and the highest growth in Norway and Sweden, and 
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in Europe in general (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2018). This motivates us to analyze 
differences in credit quality and credit risk premiums for companies receiving funding 
through crowdlending between Norway and Sweden. 
1.1 Research questions 
If differences in crowdlending regulations influence the selection of companies receiving 
funding through crowdlending, then this should also be evident in the credit quality of 
comparable companies cross-border. Moreover, if differences in credit quality are evident, 
this further suggests that convergence of regulations cross-border could imply convergence 
in credit quality. This motivates the first research question of this thesis:  
“Are there any differences in credit quality between Norwegian and Swedish companies 
receiving funding through crowdlending?” 
The credit quality of a company receiving funding through crowdlending impacts the risk of 
investing in a loan issued to that company. Thus, standard economic theory would suggest 
that differences in credit quality should affect the credit risk premium on that loan. This 
motivates the second research question of this thesis:  
“Are there any differences in credit risk premiums on loans issued to comparable 
Norwegian and Swedish companies through crowdlending?” 
1.2 Delimitations 
In order to answer the research questions as precisely as possible, we will make the 
following delimitations. First and foremost, we will analyze loans issued to companies, and 
will disregard loans issued to individuals. Further, we will analyze loans issued to companies 
in Norway and Sweden and disregard loans issued to companies in other countries. Lastly, 
the companies will be analyzed at the time when they received funding through 
crowdlending for the first time. This is because when a company applies for a loan for the 
first time, the investors must rely solely on financial statements. The next time the company 
applies for a loan, investors will have additional information about their repayment of the 
first loan. 
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1.3 Outline 
The thesis is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant 
literature as well as a more detailed background for the thesis. Chapter 3 describes the 
chosen methodology used for empirical analysis. Chapter 4 describes the data collection 
process and the data pre-processing, in addition to descriptive statistics about the dataset. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of the analysis. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of 
the empirical results in light of the research questions. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and 
concludes on the research questions. Chapter 8 addresses any possible limitations with the 
thesis. 
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2. Literature Review and Background 
Crowdfunding has experienced tremendous growth over the last decade, and this has led to 
more reports and research on the subject. There is still little research on crowdfunding 
compared to other types of financing, but in this chapter, we will present the existing 
research. Firstly, we will present previous research on crowdfunding. Secondly, we will 
address the different types of crowdfunding. Thirdly, we will present research on 
crowdlending, which is the focus of this thesis. Finally, we will elaborate on the Norwegian 
and Swedish crowdlending markets, including platforms, market growth, and regulations. 
2.1 Crowdfunding 
One of the earliest known crowdfunding events happened in 1885, when Joseph Pulitzer, a 
newspaper publisher, raised $102,000 from the New York citizens to the pedestal of the 
Statue of Liberty (Gierczak et al., 2015). Although financing projects with the help of the 
crowd is not a new concept, there has been increased attention and growth of crowdfunding 
the last two decades. One of the main reasons for this is that it has become much easier to 
reach the crowd through the internet. As crowdfunding is an emerging concept that 
constantly evolves, a complete definition without limitations is difficult to find (Mollick and 
Kuppuswamy, 2014).  
Gierczak et al. (2015) describe crowdfunding as a source of financing where: “A large 
amount of money can be raised by accumulating small contributions from a large group of 
backers.” This usually happens via crowdfunding platforms on the internet, which means 
that financial intermediaries such as banks are avoided (Mollick, 2014). Belleflamme et al. 
(2010) further state that the objective of crowdfunding is to collect money for investments 
and provide entrepreneurs with an alternative way of financing. 
2.1.1 Types of crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is often divided into four different categories: donation-based, reward-based, 
equity-based, and lending-based crowdfunding (Kuti and Madarász, 2014; Mollick, 2014). 
For all types, the crowd invests a monetary amount in a cause, a project, or a company. The 
main difference between them is how the investors are repaid. In donation- and reward-based 
crowdfunding, investors do not receive any monetary returns. However, investors in reward-
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based crowdfunding receive a repayment in the form of a product or a service (Kuti and 
Madarász, 2014; Mollick, 2014). In equity-based crowdfunding, investors receive a share of 
the equity of the company receiving funding (Kuti and Madarász, 2014; Mollick, 2014). In 
lending-based crowdfunding, the investors usually receive a fixed interest during the loan 
period, and the principal repaid at maturity (Kuti and Madarász, 2014; Mollick, 2014). 
2.2 Crowdlending 
Lending-based crowdfunding, referred to as crowdlending, is usually divided into two types: 
Business and consumer loans (Baeck et al., 2014). Business loans are mainly given to small 
and medium enterprises, i.e., SMEs (Dietrich et al., 2019).  
Baeck et al. (2014) conducted a survey on important factors for why borrowers and lenders 
use crowdlending platforms. Their findings provide information on why there is supply and 
demand for crowdlending. They found that the three most important factors for why 
borrowers seek financing through crowdlending are because it is easier to get funding than 
through traditional channels such as banks, how quick they can receive financing and the 
ease of use of crowdlending platforms. For the lenders, the three most important things are to 
make a financial return, to diversify their portfolio, and to support an alternative to the big 
banks (Baeck et al., 2014). 
2.3 Crowdlending in Norway and Sweden 
Crowdlending platforms were established later in Norway and Sweden than in many other 
countries. The first Swedish crowdlending platform offering business loans was established 
in 2013, and this platform is called Toborrow (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2018). Other 
active Swedish platforms offering business loans are Kameo (2014), Tessin (2014), Savelend 
(2014), and Trine (2015). Norway established its first platform later than Sweden. Kameo 
arranged the first crowdlending business loan in Norway in 2017 (Weldeghebriel, 2018). 
One of the reasons for the late start is the strict and unclear regulations for operating a 
crowdlending platform in Norway (Norges Offentlige Utredninger, 2018). In addition to 
Kameo, Monner (2018) and FundingPartner (2018) constitute the market for business loans 
in Norway. There are only a few reports about crowdlending statistics for Norway and 
Sweden. Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance published an international report, and 
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this report provides market data for 2016 and 2017. In addition, Shneor (2021) has collected 
data on the Norwegian market on behalf of the Norwegian Crowdfunding Association. In 
2016, the total market volume of business loans1 in Sweden was $27.2 million, and in 2017 
the volume had grown to $58.5 million, which implies an annual growth of 115% (Ziegler et 
al., 2019). No business loans were given in Norway in 2016, but the total volume in 2017 
was $2.9 million (Ziegler et al., 2019). According to Shneor (2021), the total market volume 
in Norway was $30.8 million in 2019, and $52.9 million in 2020. The annual growth rate in 
Norway from 2019 to 2020 is 71%. Data from these two reports indicate that crowdlending 
in Norway and Sweden are experiencing a tremendous growth, and especially in the business 
loans segment. 
2.3.1 Regulations 
2.3.1.1 Current regulations 
As crowdlending is still a relatively new form of financing, there are still discussions about 
regulations for crowdlending platforms. Since there are no common set of rules across 
countries, the Norwegian market is subject to Finanstilsynet’s (Norwegian Financial 
Authority) regulations, and the Swedish market is subject to Finansinspektionen’s (Swedish 
Financial Authority) regulations. The regulations are currently very different between 
Norway and Sweden, which affect the development of crowdlending within the countries.  
In Norway, there is no separate law or licensing for crowdlending, and the platforms are 
therefore subject to The Financial Supervision Act. This implies, among other things, that 
the platforms cannot offer loan pools, which is a collection of several loans (Finanstilsynet, 
2018). Further, any investor, either individual or institutional, cannot invest more than NOK 
1 million per year (Finanstilsynet, 2019). Additionally, Norwegian crowdlending platforms 
are required to be independent of both the borrower and the lender (Finanstilsynet, 2017; 
Næsse, 2019). This means that the crowdlending platforms cannot facilitate forced collection 
of the loan principal in the event of default. Instead, the loan agreements typically include a 
clause that regulates the potential forced collection by the use of a debt collection partner 
such as Lindorff Finans (Berg, 2019). A review of Norwegian crowdlending platforms 
 
1 Business loans are loans given to businesses, including real estate. 
Literature Review and Background  7 
shows that their debt collection partners typically charge between 10% and 20% of the 
collected amount (Appendix A 1).  
There is no separate law for crowdlending in Sweden either. Crowdlending is therefore 
subject to The Banking and Finance Business Act (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2018). 
However, this law has different implications on crowdlending than in Norway. In Sweden, 
loan pools are not prohibited, and there is no investment limit of NOK 1 million. This means 
that Swedish platforms may issue loans that are guaranteed to be fully subscribed by either 
professional investors or financial institutions. Further, Swedish platforms are allowed to 
facilitate the forced collection of principal in the event of default. Thus, there is no legal 
requirement for platforms to use debt collection partners.  
In summary, the regulations in Norway and Sweden are different, and the biggest differences 
are specified above. Hereunder are the limitations regarding investment amount, loan pools, 
and debt collection partner requirements. The more restrictive regulations in Norway have 
huge implications and make the Norwegian crowdlending market unattractive for both 
existing and new players, according to the Norwegian Crowdfunding Association (Norsk 
Crowdfunding Forening, 2019). 
2.3.1.2 New European Union regulative: Common regulations 
In order to create a uniform set of rules for crowdlending platforms, the European Union 
passed a common regulation for all member states in October 2020, which will apply from 
November 2021 (European Union, 2020). European Union (2021) defines a regulation as “a 
binding legislative act”, which implies that the regulation will apply in the member states 
without having to be adopted by each individual country. The regulation is currently being 
considered by the EFTA states2 with the aim of implementing it in the EEA Agreement3. 
This will also make the regulation applicable in Norway (Regjeringen, 2021).  
The EU regulation will have many implications for crowdlending in Europe (European 
Union, 2020). The definition of crowdlending platforms will change in the legislation of the 
 
2 European Free Trade Association are states that do not belong to the European Union (EU) but have many of the same 
agreements and rules. Norway is one of the EFTA states. 
3 European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement is a trade agreement between the EFTA states and the EU states. 
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European countries. This legislation will only apply for business loans up to €5 million4 per 
year for each project owner without the obligation of drawing up a prospectus. Further, it 
will be created a separate license to operate crowdlending platforms. For this new licensing, 
a common set of rules will be made for all EU and EEA countries. The goal is that cross-
border crowdlending will be easier, more accessible, and cheaper (European Union, 2020). 
This will enable investors to have a more diversified portfolio, and project owners will be 
more likely to get fully subscribed loans.  
Further, a distinction will be made between sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors. 
One of the purposes of this distinction is to ensure adequate investor protection. The 
crowdlending platforms are subject to several measures to address this issue. They will have 
a responsibility to ensure that non-sophisticated investors acknowledge the risk associated 
with the investment. In addition, the non-sophisticated investors will be allowed to invest a 
maximum amount in each project without further safeguards. The sophisticated, professional 
investors will, on the other hand, not be subject to any maximum amount limit. This will 
most likely also contribute to higher subscription rates on the loans.  
The EU regulation will cause the Norwegian regulations to converge towards the current 
Swedish regulations. The peculiar investment limit for Norwegian investors of a maximum 
of NOK 1 million per year will disappear, and the new practice will consequently be similar 
to the current Swedish regulations. Removing this rule in Norway may greatly impact the 
further development of crowdlending, as the restriction currently makes it less interesting for 
professional investors and financial institutions to invest in crowdlending.  
The new EU regulation has been well received by the crowdlending community in Norway. 
The previous Chairman of the Norwegian Crowdfunding Association and CEO of 
FundingPartner, Geir Atle Bore, has commented on the new regulation. He believes it will 
be a gamechanger for Norwegian crowdlending and lead to both increased consumer 
protection and growth (Nilssen, 2020). According to Deloitte, the new regulation will lead to 
big changes for the crowdlending market in Norway (Deloitte Advokatfirma, 2021). Deloitte 
believes it will most likely lead to increased demand for crowdlending services. 
 
4 Equivalent to NOK 51 million (27.03.21). 
Literature Review and Background  9 
2.3.1.3 Perceived adequacy of current regulations and market volumes 
Analysis from Ziegler et al. (2020, p. 105) shows the relationship between perceived 
regulatory adequacy and market volume per capita in European countries. It indicates a 
strong positive relationship between the share of platforms indicating adequate regulation 
and the alternative finance volume per capita for the respective countries. Figure 1 shows 
that the majority of platforms operating in Norway perceive the regulation as inadequate, as 
opposed to in Sweden. Further, it shows that the volume per capita is considerably lower in 
Norway than in Sweden. 
 
Figure 1: Regulation adequacy and alternative finance volume 
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3. Methodology 
In this chapter we will elaborate on the methodologies we will be using in the analysis. 
Firstly, the motivation for applying matching in the pre-processing of data, and the choice of 
method are described. Secondly, bankruptcy prediction models which will serve as proxies 
for credit quality will be described. Thirdly, winsorization as a tool for handling extreme 
outliers will be described. Lastly, we will elaborate on the chosen estimators for statistical 
inference. 
3.1 Matching 
In experimental research, it is possible to determine valid causal inference due to three 
important features related to the data generation process: (1) Random selection, (2) random 
assignment, and (3) large sample size (Ho et al., 2007). These features, commonly associated 
with Random Control Trials (RCT), are considered to be the “gold standard” for determining 
the causal effects of medical interventions (Wooldridge, 2016). In our case, however, it is 
neither practically feasible nor appropriate to conduct either scientific experiments or 
intervention studies. Thus, our study relies on observational data about actual loans and 
borrowers in Norway and Sweden. By using observational data, a key issue regarding the 
data generation process is raised: The mechanism for assigning treatment is not under the 
control of the researchers. This implies that the assignment mechanism is not random, which 
is a potential source of bias. Furthermore, using observational data opens up for bias from 
model dependence (King and Zeng, 2007).  
In order to address these issues, Iacus et al. (2012) suggest using a data pre-processing 
technique called matching. By using well-matched samples from the groups of treated and 
untreated it is possible to reduce both model dependence and statistical bias. Several 
different matching techniques have been used extensively across research disciplines such as 
economics, epidemiology, medicine and political science. Stuart (2010) presents a review of 
their prevalence and applications. The most prominent technique by far is the Propensity 
Score Matching technique (from here on “PSM”), which was first defined by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin in 1983. However, recently the PSM technique has been found to be dominated 
by other techniques such as Coarsened Exact Matching (from here on “CEM”). A study 
conducted by King and Nielsen (2019) shows that PSM actually leads to increased 
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imbalance, decreased efficiency, increased model dependence, and increased statistical bias. 
The same study determines that CEM is dominant relative to PSM. We therefore choose to 
apply the CEM technique in this thesis. 
3.1.1 Coarsened exact matching 
In this subchapter the CEM matching technique will be described. The CEM technique was 
first presented in a paper by Iacus, King and Porro (2008). Here, the authors introduce a new 
class of matching techniques in addition to Equal Percent Bias Reducing class (from here on 
“EPBR”) in which PSM belongs. The new class is named Monotonic Imbalance Bounding. 
CEM belongs to the new class, and in a subsequent paper by Iacus, King and Porro (2012), 
the benefits of CEM are substantiated further. Compared to PSM and other EPBR 
techniques, CEM guarantees that the imbalance between matched samples is reduced ex ante 
the researcher's choice. Further, CEM does not require additional assumptions to be made, 
other than the standard ignorability assumption as below. 
Conditional on X the treatment variable is independent of potential outcomes: 
 
The goal of CEM is to pre-process data by coarsening observations of each variable into 
exact or broader groups. Continuous variables can be grouped in intervals, while categorical 
variables can be grouped in larger categories. When CEM has been successfully 
implemented the data is ready for further analysis by standard econometric techniques. 
Implementation of CEM can be divided into three distinct steps (Iacus et al., 2012): 
1. Coarsening: An informed choice on which variables to include in the matching, and 
how they should be coarsened must be made. This includes first to determine if a 
variable should be matched exactly or coarsened. If the variable should be coarsened, 
the researcher must determine the size of the bin interval. This step is the most 
important for implementing CEM as it determines the boundaries for both model 
dependence and estimation error. 
2. Implementation: The previously determined matching criterion is implemented and 
the observations are sorted into strata. This step is typically conducted in a statistical 
software such as R or Stata. 
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3. Analysis: Only strata containing observations from the groups of both treated and 
untreated are retained for further analysis. If there are stratum containing uneven 
numbers of control observations compared to treated observations, then CEM 
requires that weighting must be included. 
3.1.1.1 Coarsening 
Literature does not provide a clear answer as to which variables should be included in the 
coarsening. However, Iacus et al. (2012) state that variables deemed as relevant by the 
researchers, based on their existing in-depth knowledge on the subject should be used. 
Another obvious boundary in observational studies is to use observed variables. Further, Ho 
et al. (2007) state that variables that could even slightly be affected by the treatment variable 
should never be controlled for, as this would prevent causal inference due to bias. The goal 
of our analysis is to pinpoint differences in credit quality and credit risk premiums across the 
Norwegian and the Swedish crowdlending markets due to differences in regulatory climate. 
Thus, any variables that might be regarded as a consequence of why the company has taken 
a loan through a Swedish crowdlending platform should not be controlled for. 
Further, the more coarsened each variable is, or in other words, the larger each “bin interval” 
is, the more of both model dependence and estimation error is allowed (Iacus et al., 2012). 
This is because fewer observations are dropped leaving a higher number of matches. 
Conversely, the less coarsened each variable is, or in other words, the smaller each “bin 
interval” is, the less model dependence and estimation error is allowed. This is because more 
observations are dropped, due to fewer matches. Thus, the decision of how coarsened each 
variable should be includes a trade-off that the researcher must take into account. The 
researcher can use small bin intervals and discard a lot of data or use broad bin intervals and 
retain more data.  
 
The variables and their corresponding bin size used in the analysis are the following: 
Size: Companies of different sizes may vary greatly on a wide set of dimensions, such as 
capital structure, governance structure, sources of financing and more. Thus, this variable is 
deemed relevant to include. In our data, each company’s level of total assets on the balance 
sheet is used as a proxy for its size. Alternative measures could be the number of employees 
or annual turnover. As the size of companies engaging in crowdlending in Norway and 
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Sweden usually range from total capital of NOK 0,- to NOK 250 000 000,- we find it 
purposeful to coarsen this variable into four different bin intervals as presented in Table 1. 
BIN TOTAL CAPITAL 
Negative < NOK 0 
Small firms NOK 0 to NOK 20 000 000 
Medium firms NOK 20 000 001 to NOK 100 000 000 
Large firms > NOK 100 000 000 
Table 1: Bin intervals for total capital 
Year: In order to avoid bias from time variant economic effects we include the year of 
reporting for each company’s financial statements. This way we avoid comparing a company 
that took a loan in 2016 with a company that took a loan in 2019. As year is an integer 
variable, we choose to employ exact matching.  
Industry: Companies may vary greatly across industries on many different dimensions, such 
as capital structure, governance structure, sources of financing and more. Thus, this variable 
is deemed relevant to include. In our data, we have registered each company’s industry based 
on the industry it is assigned to on the crowdlending platforms. As industry is a categorical 
variable, we choose to employ exact matching. 
Age: Age of a company influences the company in many ways. Older companies are more 
likely to have an established business model, and are often perceived as less risky. Further, 
older companies have a longer accounting history making it easier to assess their 
performance. Robb (2002) classifies companies by age in the following intervals: Young 
firms less than 5 years, middle aged firms, 5-24 years old, old firms 25 years and older. We 
choose to use the same classification as Robb, as it fits well with our knowledge of 
companies engaging in crowdlending activities. Table 2 presents an overview of the 
coarsening. 
BIN COMPANY AGE 
Young firm 0 to 4 years 
Middle aged firms 5 to 24 years 
Mature firms > 24 years 
Table 2: Bin intervals for age 
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Table 3 presents an overview of the included variables: 
VARIABLE COARSENING 
Size Intervals 
Reporting year Exact 
Industry Exact 
Age Intervals 
Table 3: Overview of matching variables 
3.1.1.2 Imbalance measurements  
The purpose of pre-processing data with CEM is to reduce imbalance between the 
observations of the treated and control units, thus reducing both model dependence and 
estimation error. In order to determine the scope of improvement, it is useful to measure 
imbalance between the samples before and after matching. As our samples include data on 
several variables, such a metric should encompass the distance between the multivariate 
empirical distributions of pretreatment covariates. For this exact purpose, Iacus et al. (2011) 
propose to use the L1 imbalance measurement which is presented below: 
 
The variables f and g denote the respective relative empirical frequency distribution for the 
treated and control units. Further, the term fℓ1...ℓk denotes the relative frequency for 
observations belonging to the cell with coordinates ℓ1...ℓk of the multivariate cross-
tabulation. The term gℓ1...ℓk denotes the corresponding relative frequency for the cell with 
coordinates ℓ1...ℓk. Lastly, the H term denotes a set of bins, and is included to underscore the 
importance of using the same set of bins when comparing imbalance across matching 
methods. 
The L1 measurement proposed by Iacus et al. (2011) has several advantages compared to 
other imbalance measurements. Firstly, it encompasses the distance between the multivariate 
empirical distributions of pretreatment covariates. Other commonly used measurements do 
not encompass this, but typically rather only measure the average of differences in means 
across the matched treatment and control samples. Secondly, the L1 measurement is easy to 
understand and has an intuitive interpretation: For any given set of bins represented by H the 
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L1 measurement is equal to 0 if the multivariate empirical distributions exactly coincide, or 1 
if they are completely separated. Thus, any decrease in the L1 statistic after matching equals 
reduced imbalance between the samples of observations of the treated and control units. 
3.1.1.3 K-to-K matching 
According to Ho et al. (2007), if the matching method used produces matches with an equal 
number of treated and control units in each stratum, any analysis method that would have 
been used without matching, such as for example OLS regression, can be applied on the 
matched dataset only with lower model dependence after matching. This is also known as K-
to-K matching. Thus, K-to-K matching eases both analysis and interpretation of the results 
after matching. However, if the used matching method allows for K-to-J matching, 
effectively allowing different numbers of treated and control units in each stratum, one must 
adjust the analysis method. Iacus et al. (2012) describe one such method, where the 
researcher must weigh or adjust for stratum sizes in order to determine the causal effect of 
interest. The advantage of allowing for K-to-J matching is that one does not have to remove 
as much data as when it is only allowed for K-to-K matching. In our view, the advantages of 
K-to-K matching are favorable in comparison to the alternative of using K-to-J matching. 
This is in particular true because we find that K-to-K matching is feasible with the amount of 
data we possess. We therefore restrict the CEM algorithm to K-to-K matching.  
The method we use to implement K-to-K matching is described by Iacus et al. (2009), and is 
based on random matching inside each stratum. To exemplify; a stratum of one treated unit 
matched in a stratum with five control units would be reduced to a matched pair of the same 
treated unit and a randomly chosen unit among the other five. According to Iacus et al. 
(2009) this method of randomly selecting the matching within each stratum could further 
reduce bias. 
3.2 Choice of method for analysis of credit quality 
It is in our interest to find a quantitative measure for credit quality to be able to answer the 
first research question. The credit quality of a company is related to what type of credit 
rating the company has. Credit rating is determined based on how likely it is that the 
borrower will be able to repay the loan, i.e., the probability that the company will go 
16  Methodology 
bankrupt (Kagan, 2021). Among the alternatives for this are structural credit risk models and 
bankruptcy prediction models.  
One method for determining credit quality is structural credit risk models, such as Robert C. 
Merton’s model from 1974 (Sundaresan, 2009, p. 210). This model gives a quantitative 
assessment of credit quality by calculating the probability of default and the loss given 
default. One of the required variables for using this model is the standard deviation of stock 
returns, i.e., stock volatility. Since this is not possible to estimate for private crowdlending 
companies, Merton’s model is not suitable as a proxy for credit quality in this analysis.  
Another method for analyzing credit quality is bankruptcy prediction models, such as the 
Altman Z-score model from 1968 (Altman, 1968). This model estimates a score for a 
company based on ratios from the financial statements. The score determines whether the 
company is likely to be bankrupt or not within one year. Since there is no publicly available 
information about the credit rating of companies receiving funding through crowdlending in 
Norway and Sweden, bankruptcy prediction models constitute the most suitable way to 
address credit quality. 
3.3 Bankruptcy prediction models 
In this subchapter we will elaborate on the development within bankruptcy prediction 
models. In addition, the fundamental differences between different approaches to prediction 
bankruptcy will be explained in detail. Firstly, we will describe the general types of 
bankruptcy prediction models. Thereafter, the two chosen models will be described and the 
reasoning for the choice will be motivated. 
3.3.1 Types of bankruptcy prediction models 
If a company becomes insolvent, there will be negative consequences for most of the 
stakeholders in the company, such as investors, employees, customers, and suppliers 
(Jackson and Wood, 2013). This implies that many players have a great interest in knowing 
whether a company is healthy or not. Bankruptcy prediction models can provide insight on 
the financial health of companies. As a result of many defaults and bankruptcies, as well as 
developments in requirements for banks, bankruptcy prediction models have been a 
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frequently researched topic within corporate finance the last decades (Altman and Hotchkiss, 
2006, p. 233).  
Many bankruptcy prediction models have been developed in the last decades, and various 
classical statistical methods have been used (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). Until the 1960’s, 
univariate analysis was the dominant method (Bellovary et al., 2007). In univariate analysis, 
the predictive ability is measured for one financial ratio at a time (Beaver, 1966). Since the 
1960’s, multivariate analysis has been more frequently used (Bellovary et al., 2007). It 
differs from a univariate analysis in that it looks at several different ratios at a time (Beaver, 
1966). Within multivariate analysis, the most common statistical techniques for bankruptcy 
prediction models are discriminant analysis, logit analysis, probit analysis and neural 
networks (Bellovary et al., 2007).  
Research shows that none of the multivariate methodologies have a clearly higher predictive 
power than the other. Laitinen and Kankaanpää (1999) tested the accuracy of several 
methodologies used in bankruptcy prediction models. They found that neither logit analysis, 
neural networks, or other methodologies are significantly better than linear discriminant 
analysis. Another paper from Azir and Dar (2006) substantiates this. They find that the 
predictive accuracy between the different methodologies is comparable.  
Multivariate discriminant analysis (from here on “MDA”) is a method that is easy to use, 
applicable and effective (Peres and Antão, 2016). None of the other methods for predicting 
bankruptcy are as simple to use, interpret and apply as MDA (Peres and Antão, 2016). 
Further, MDA is shown to provide low Type I and Type II error5 rates, making this 
methodology the most reliable for predicting bankruptcies (Azir and Dar, 2006). 
Consequently, the MDA method is the most frequently used in bankruptcy prediction models 
(Jackson and Wood, 2013). Based on the high predictive accuracy and intuitive 
interpretation, we choose to apply MDA models in our thesis.  
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006, p 239) explain how these models are derived. The first step is 
to classify the companies as bankrupt or non-bankrupt. After this, data from financial 
statements is collected. Then, a list of potential variables (i.e., financial ratios) are tested. 
 
5 “Type I errors are the misclassification of bankrupt firms as non-bankrupt. Type II errors are the reverse - non-bankrupt 
firms misclassified as bankrupt firms.” (Bellovary et al., 2007). 
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From this test, the most suitable variables for prediction are selected. Finally, computer 
algorithms are utilized to determine coefficients for calculating a score for each company, 
and this is referred to as the Z-score. After a Z-score is calculated for each company, one can 
rank the companies after their Z-score. A higher Z-score means a healthier company, and 
vice versa. A cut-off point then divides the companies that are viable from those that are 
highly likely to go bankrupt. A Z-score below the cut-off point implies that the company is 
unhealthy. The MDA models use a similar function to calculate the Z-score (Jackson and 
Wood, 2013): 
 
where Zi is the singular score of company i, α is a constant, Xin is the attributes (financial 
ratios or other variables) for company i, and βn is the coefficient estimates for each attribute. 
There are several MDA models. They have a similar form of the function for calculating Z-
score, but differ in the choice of financial ratios and coefficient estimates. The variables in 
the function are most often ratios for profitability, liquidity, and leverage (Dambolena and 
Khoury, 1980). 
The first MDA model for bankruptcy prediction was published by Edward I. Altman in 
1968, and is known as the Altman Z-score model (Altman, 1968). This is among the most 
well-known models (Bellovary et al., 2007), and is also the bankruptcy prediction model that 
is most frequently used (Altman, 2018). The model has been shown to provide a very high 
predictability. It is able to predict with 95% accuracy one year prior to bankruptcy, and 72% 
accuracy two years prior to bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). Based on the high predictive power 
and reputation, we choose to apply the Altman Z-score model in this thesis.  
Many of the various MDA models are derived with a dataset consisting of American 
companies. Richard J. Taffler derived an MDA model for European companies, and in 1983 
he published a model with a dataset consisting of companies from the UK. We argue that 
UK companies are relatively more similar to Norwegian and Swedish companies. One of the 
reasons for this is that the UK was a member of the European Union until 2020, and has thus 
had many of the same rights and obligations as Norway and Sweden. Taffler is a well-known 
MDA model, which proves to have good predictive abilities decades after it was published 
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(Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). Consequently, we choose to apply the Taffler (1983) Z-score 
model in this thesis. 
3.3.2 Altman's Z-score model 
The Altman Z-score model is a bankruptcy prediction model first published in 1968, and the 
model predicts whether a company will go bankrupt within two years (Altman, 1968). This 
is the most used bankruptcy model (Altman, 2018), and research shows that it still provides 
accurate results in recent times (Sherbo and Smith, 2013). The model calculates a Z-score for 
a company by using financial ratios from the income statement and balance sheet. This Z-
score indicates how likely it is that a company will go bankrupt within two years.  
The original model from 1968 is derived using a sample of public companies, and contains 
five different financial ratios (Altman, 1968). Since one of these metrics includes market 
value of equity, this model is not applicable for private companies. In 1983, Altman 
published a model for private companies. The market value of equity was substituted with 
the book value of equity, and one financial ratio was excluded to remove a potential industry 
effect (Altman, 1983). Then a re-estimation was performed with a dataset of private 
companies to find new coefficients. Research from Altman, Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Laitinen 
and Suvas (2017) show that the re-estimated model performs very well in an international 
context. Since most of the companies funded through crowdlending are private, the 1983-
model is most appropriate for this thesis. This model consists of four financial ratios for 
profitability, leverage, and liquidity. 
The revised Altman (1983) model for private companies is the following: 
 
where 
X1 = Working capital/Total assets (Net liquid assets)  
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total assets (Earned surplus)  
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets (Profitability of assets)  
X4 = Book value of equity/Book value of total liabilities (Leverage ratio) 
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3.3.3 Taffler's Z-score model 
Taffler's Z-score model (1983) is another bankruptcy prediction model and has similar 
characteristics to Altman’s Z-score model. The sample used to derive this model are public 
industrial UK companies, but are applicable for private companies as it is only based on 
book values. This model also calculates a Z-score based on weighted financial ratios, and 
includes four ratios for profitability, working capital position, financial risk, and liquidity 
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2007).  
Taffler (1983) found that a Z-score can be calculated using this formula: 
 
where 
X1 = Profit before tax/Current liabilities (Profitability)  
X2 = Current assets/Total liabilities (Working capital position)  
X3 = Current liabilities/Total assets (Financial risk)  
X4 = No credit interval (Liquidity) 
The fourth ratio, no credit interval, is the number of days a company would be able to 
finance its operations without generating any revenue (Taffler, 1983). The number of days is 
found by calculating quick assets/daily expenses (Kenton, 2020). 
3.4 Winsorization 
In a limited dataset such as ours, the average and variance of Z-scores are highly sensitive to 
outlier values. Therefore, we find it useful to assess the impact of outlier values by re-
estimating the statistical models after adjusting for these and compare the outcomes. The 
technique we apply is called winsorization. According to a recent paper in the Journal of 
Financial Management, winsorization is the most commonly applied technique to handle 
outlier values in finance (Adams et al., 2019). However, the winsorization technique has 
been criticized for inducing some bias from changing the outlier values (Bollinger and 
Chandra, 2005). The potential bias introduced from winsorization is in any case less than the 
bias introduced from other comparable techniques, such as trimming (Bieniek, 2016). For 
these reasons, we choose to include results both with and without winsorization applied.  
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Winsorization is a technique that adjusts for outlier values by changing them to the value of 
a specified percentile. We choose to apply a 10% winsorization which implies that all values 
below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile is set equal to the value of the 5th 
percentile and the 95th percentile, respectively. 
3.5 Estimator for statistical inference 
Pre-processing data by applying a matching method, such as CEM, does not affect the choice 
of estimator for statistical inference, as long as the chosen method produces K-to-K matches 
(Ho et al., 2007). Thus, our choice of estimator is unaffected by the pre-processing. 
However, through pre-processing the data, we aim to reduce both sample imbalance and 
estimation error. The goal of our analysis is to assess differences in credit quality and credit 
risk premiums between companies receiving funding through Norwegian and Swedish 
crowdlending platforms. An appropriate estimator for this purpose is the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimator. In the following subchapter we will first present the general 
statistical properties of the OLS estimator. Thereafter, the assumptions related to the 
estimator will be presented and discussed. 
3.5.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
OLS is a linear estimator that determines the coefficients in a uni- or multivariate regression 
by minimizing the squared sum of residuals. The estimator is in the form of the following 
equation: 
 
where 𝛽0 represents the intercept, 𝛽i represents the effect of the independent variable xi on 
the dependent variable Y, and u represents an error term of unexplained variation. 
The goal of the analysis is inter alia to infer the effect of a binary independent variable x on a 
continuous dependent variable Y. In cases such as these, where x1 is a binary variable, then 
𝛽1 represents the difference in the mean value of Y across the subsamples with x = 1 and x = 
0 (Wooldridge et al., 2016). 
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3.5.2 Assumptions 
There are four critical assumptions that must hold for the OLS estimator to be unbiased 
(Wooldridge et al., 2016). Firstly, there must be linearity in parameters. Secondly, the 
sampling of observations must be random. Thirdly, there must be variation in the 
independent variable. Lastly, the error term u must have a zero-conditional mean.  
The first assumption of linearity in parameters is trivial, as we estimate the effect of a binary 
independent variable x on a continuous outcome variable Y. As our study is observational, 
the second assumption could be more difficult to satisfy. However, by applying CEM as 
described in chapter 3.1.1, we have approximated random sampling. Thus, we consider the 
second assumption to be satisfied as well. The third assumption of variation in the 
independent variable is satisfied as our dataset contains observations of both Norwegian and 
Swedish companies. The fourth assumption about zero conditional mean in the error term 
must be diagnosed by assessing a plot of the residuals.  
Additionally, there is a fifth and last optional assumption. It stems from the Gauss-Markov 
theorem and is related to homoscedasticity in the error term. Homoskedasticity implies that 
the error term u has the same variance for all values of the independent variables. This 
implies that the residuals should be independently and identically distributed. If this 
assumption holds, then the estimator is said to be the best linear unbiased estimator. 
However, this assumption is often violated. In such cases it is necessary to adjust the 
standard errors. 
3.5.3 Adjusted standard errors 
If heteroskedasticity is present and the residuals are correlated within groups but not between 
groups then it is appropriate to use clustered standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
The reason for this is that the classic OLS standard errors could overstate the precision of the 
estimator (i.e., produce too small standard errors). In our analysis it is reasonable to assume 
that the residuals for observations from the same reporting year could be correlated as the 
company financials of that year have been exposed to the same macroeconomic factors. For 
this reason, we choose to report adjusted standard errors clustered on year-level.  
For the sake of nuance, we will also include one other commonly used method for adjusting 
standard errors in Appendix A 3, namely heteroskedastic robust standard errors. There are 
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several different methods of estimating heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Long and 
Ervin (2000) conducted a study where they compared different estimators for 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which concluded that the HC3-variant should be 
used if the sample size is less than n = 250. Based on this, we choose to use HC3 since our 
sample has 108 observations. 
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4. Data 
The analysis in this thesis is conducted on a self-constructed dataset containing information 
about companies that have borrowed through crowdlending platforms in Norway and 
Sweden. In this chapter, we will elaborate on the data we have used in our study. Firstly, the 
data collection process will be described in detail. Thereafter, the data cleansing and pre-
processing will be described, and relevant choices will be discussed. Lastly, a set of relevant 
descriptive statistics will be presented, with the goal of familiarizing the readers to our data. 
4.1 Data collection 
To the best of our knowledge, no database containing information on crowdlending in 
Norway and Sweden exists. Thus, in order to conduct our analysis, we are forced to collect 
data and compile a dataset ourselves. The process of creating the dataset started with 
identifying all relevant crowdlending platforms in Norway and Sweden. Then, information 
about every loan issued through the said platforms was sought out and downloaded. 
Thereafter, a list of companies that had borrowed through these crowdlending platforms 
were identified. Lastly, relevant financial information about these companies was 
downloaded and compiled in a list. In the following chapters we will elaborate in detail on 
each step of the process. 
4.1.1 Process and data sources 
Throughout the data collection process, we have used several different sources of data. In the 
following we will describe the sources we have used.  
Firstly, we identified all crowdlending platforms in Norway and Sweden. Norwegian 
platforms are easy to identify as the Norwegian Crowdfunding Association (Norsk 
Crowdfunding Forening, 2021) offers a comprehensive list of the crowdfunding platforms in 
Norway. In Sweden there is no such industry association, but the industry webpage 
P2PMarketData (2021) presents an overview of crowdfunding platforms in Sweden. In order 
to verify that no platforms are left out, we search the web using Google and Bing. In total, 14 
different crowdlending platforms are identified. Out of these, eight platforms offer 
exclusively business loans, one offers both business and personal loans, while five offers 
exclusively personal loans. As the thesis focuses on loans issued to businesses and not 
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consumers, the number of potentially relevant platforms are reduced from 14 to nine. One 
platform has not yet commenced operations. By removing this, the number of potentially 
relevant platforms are reduced from nine to eight. Lastly, two platforms focus exclusively on 
special purpose environmental financing in developing countries. As the focus in this thesis 
is to compare crowdlending in Norway and Sweden, these platforms are also removed from 
the list. This leaves us with a total of six relevant crowdlending platforms in Norway and 
Sweden.  
Secondly, in order to collect information about loans issued through crowdlending, we either 
had to gain access to the platform or receive data sent over from the platform. We were able 
to register at four out of six relevant platforms, and were thus able to collect information 
from these. These were FundingPartner, Kameo, Monner, and Tessin. The two platforms that 
we did not gain access to were contacted, but did not wish to share information with us. 
These were Savelend and Toborrow. This is limiting the generality of our study somewhat, 
as it blocked us from compiling a completely exhaustive dataset. However, we are still of the 
opinion that the data we have collected is representative for the Norwegian and the Swedish 
crowdlending markets.  
Thirdly, after identifying the unique companies that have borrowed through the relevant 
crowdlending platforms in Norway and Sweden, we collect relevant financial information 
about each company. This information is downloaded from Proff.no and Proff.se for the 
Norwegian and Swedish companies, respectively. “Proff” is a service that publishes all 
companies registered financial statements online in both Norway and Sweden. Thus, we are 
able to collect the relevant information needed for our analysis.  
Lastly, we also accessed Norges Bank and Riksbanken to download information about 
treasury bond yields.  
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Table 4: Overview of data sources 
4.1.2 Initial dataset 
The data collection process resulted in a dataset containing loan information on 822 loans in 
total. Out of these, we were able to identify the legal borrowing entity for 756 loans. Among 
these, we identified 350 unique companies that have borrowed through crowdlending 
platforms at least at one point in time. Further, it was possible to collect financial 
information for the year T-1 for 283 out of the 350 identified companies that had issued a 
loan in year T. The reason for why we keep financial data for year T-1 is because this is the 
information that was available to investors considering investing in a loan issued in year T. 
The companies that did not have any public financial information were either newly 
established, or they had gone bankrupt and were deleted from public company registries. 
Consequently, the data collection process resulted in an initial dataset of 283 companies. 
4.2 Pre-processing of data 
In this subchapter we elaborate on how we have pre-processed the initial dataset to prepare it 
for analysis. We will first describe adjustments to the dataset, including additional 
computations. Thereafter, we describe how we apply CEM to the data. 
4.2.1 Adjustments to initial dataset 
Firstly, we must compute the financial ratios that are required by the bankruptcy prediction 
models of Altman (1983) and Taffler (1983) as described in subchapter 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, and 
the associated Z-scores. This is easily done in R, and we create new columns containing the 
Z-scores from Altman and Taffler.  
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Secondly, we convert the variable “Year of establishment” from a year type to age type in 
order to determine the age of each company. This is easily implemented by subtracting the 
variable “Year” which represents the fiscal year for the financial information from the 
variable “Year of establishment”. This way, we can use “Age” for matching and as an 
independent control variable in our analysis.  
Thirdly, we create a separate column containing the credit risk premium for each loan. This 
is done by subtracting the risk-free rate from the interest rate stipulated on the loan. As a 
proxy for risk-free interest rate, we use the corresponding five-year treasury bond yield. 
Although loans have different maturity, we choose to adjust for the five-year treasury bond 
for all loans. This is because both the Norwegian and Swedish central banks offer treasury 
bonds with this maturity.  
Lastly, we remove some units from the dataset as their financial data make analysis using 
accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models such as Altman (1983) and Taffler (1983) 
impossible. This is due to some of the values in the companies’ financial statements that 
produce infinite Z-scores. Hereunder are companies that report to have either zero total 
capital, zero total debt, zero current liabilities, or zero daily expenses. By removing these 
strange cases, the number of companies in our sample is reduced from 283 to 246, of which 
131 are Norwegian and 115 are Swedish. 
4.2.2 Applying CEM 
In order to apply CEM we first had to create a dummy variable for observations belonging to 
the treatment group. Thus, we added a dummy variable with the value “1” for Swedish 
companies and “0” for Norwegian companies. Thereafter, we used the package “CEM” in R 
studio (Iacus et al., 2009) to create a sample containing the matched observations. After 
applying CEM with the coarsening intervals described in chapter 3.1.1.1 and K-to-K 
matching as described in chapter 3.1.1.3 the sample size is reduced from 246 to 108 
companies across Norway and Sweden. This is a considerable decrease in sample size. 
However, it is our opinion that the benefits of matching outweigh the disadvantages from 
reduced sample size. The main reasons for this are due to the significant reduction in sample 
imbalance after matching, as described in chapter 3.1. It follows that the L1 statistics 
measuring sample imbalance is reduced from 0.613 to 0.259 which is a considerable 
reduction.  
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Table 5 displays how the sample size is reduced through matching, as well as how the 
imbalance measure is decreased. The reason why the balance increases is because the 
matching process removes observations of control units that are outliers without proper 





COMPANIES TOTAL L1 STATISTIC 
Pre matching 115 131 246 0.613 
Post matching 54 54 108 0.259 
Table 5: Overview of sample imbalance 
4.2.3 Computing Z-scores and applying winsorization 
After applying CEM on the dataset we compute the Altman and Taffler Z-scores for each 
company as described in chapter 3.3. The Z-scores are added in separate columns in the 
dataset. In order to adjust for outliers, we also create separate columns containing winsorized 
values of Z-scores as described in chapter 3.4. 
4.3 Dataset 
The final dataset is based on the initial dataset and has been pre-processed as described in the 
former subchapter. Each row in the dataset represents an observation of a unique company 
that has issued a loan through a crowdlending platform at any point in time between 2017 
and 2020. Further, each observation includes the Altman and Taffler Z-scores computed 
based on the company’s financial statements from the fiscal year prior to issuance of its first 
loan. The purpose of this is to evaluate the credit scores of companies that are admitted to 
crowdlending platforms based on information available to investors considering investing in 
the loan. The dataset also includes the credit risk premiums computed as interest rate minus 
risk-free rate. As a proxy for risk-free rate, we use the corresponding five-year treasury bond 
yield. Further, the dataset includes a dummy variable indicating if the company is issuing a 
loan in Sweden or in Norway. 
Additionally, the final dataset retains three of the four variables that were used for matching. 
The variable “Industry” is dropped, as it is only used for matching purposes in the pre-
processing stage. The variables “Size” and “Age” are retained for use in the regression 
analysis. These variables were somewhat coarsened in the matching process. Thus, some 
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variation related to these variables might still be left in the dataset. However, the coarsened 
matching should have accounted for most of the variation, and one could argue that these 
variables are unnecessary to further control. The variable “Year” is retained as it is used for 
computing clustered standard errors.  
Table 6 displays the variables in the dataset that is retained in the final dataset after 
processing and will be used for analysis. 
VARIABLE NOTATION DATA TYPE 
Sweden dummy Treated Binary 
Altman Z-score ZA Continuous 
Altman Z-score winsorized ZA Winsorized Continuous 
Taffler Z-score ZT Continuous 
Taffler Z-score winsorized ZT Winsorized Continuous 
Credit risk premium CRP Continuous 
Size Total capital Continuous 
Age Age Integer 
Year Year Integer 
Table 6: Overview of variables in final dataset 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
In this subchapter descriptive statistics will be presented. The purpose is to familiarize the 
readers with the data we are using in the analysis. After matching, the sample contains 
observations of 108 unique companies. Because we have used K-to-K matching there are 
equal numbers of Norwegian and Swedish companies. 
4.4.1 Company characteristics 
Table 7 presents an overview of the size of the companies in the sample. Size is measured as 
total capital in thousand NOK. It shows that the mean of total capital among all companies is 
about NOK 15.8 million. For Norwegian companies, the mean is about NOK 14.8 million, 
and for Swedish companies the mean is about NOK 16.8 million. Further, it shows that there 
are no companies with total capital above NOK 100 million, which is the threshold for the 
largest bin. 
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Size summary 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pct. (25) Pct. (75) Max 
Total capital 108 15,790.050 15,787.040 3 4,310.5 20,975.2 84,607 
Total capital NO 54 14,797.570 14,655.570 3 4,153.8 20,251.2 65,928 
Total capital SE 54 16,782.520 16,922.490 89 6,668.2 21,340.2 84,607 
Table 7: Size summary 
Table 8 presents an overview of the age distribution of the companies in the sample. Age is 
measured in years from establishment till the year of the reported financial statements used 
in the analysis. It shows that the average age among all companies is about five years and 
four months. For Norwegian companies, the average age is about five years and one month, 
and for Swedish companies it is about five years and eight months. 
Age summary 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pct. (25) Pct. (75) Max 
Age 108 5.370 6.109 0 1.8 6 29 
Age NO 54 5.074 5.613 0 1.2 5.8 26 
Age SE 54 5.667 6.608 0 2 6.5 29 
Table 8: Age summary 
Figure 2 displays the industries in which companies in the sample operate. As we can see all 
companies in the sample operate in the real estate industry. The reason for this is that it was 
not possible to find any matches in other industries. Figure 2 also displays the distribution of 
reporting years in the sample data. It shows that most companies are observed in 2018. The 
fewest are observed in 2016. This is because the first crowdlending loan was issued in 
Norway in 2017, and for the few loans issued in 2017, the financial statements from 2016 are 
used for the companies. Companies that applied for loans on Swedish platforms before 2017 
thus have no matches, and are not included in the dataset. 
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Figure 2: Industry and reporting year       
4.4.2 Credit quality 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of Altman Z-scores for the companies in the sample. 
The average Altman Z-score for all companies before winsorization is 7.931. After 
winsorization it is 6.430. For Norwegian companies, the average Altman Z-score before 
winsorization is 3.612. After winsorization it is 5.436. For Swedish companies, the average 
Altman Z-score before winsorization is 12.250. After winsorization it is 7.425. This 
illustrates the effect from the outlier values. 
Summary of Altman Z-scores 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pct. (25) Pct. (75) Max 
ZA 108 7.931 24.705 -124.773 3.169 9.622 155.711 
ZA NO 54 3.612 19.110 -124.773 2.944 8.925 45.848 
ZA SE 54 12.250 28.791 -20.163 3.693 11.543 155.711 
ZA Win 108 6.430 5.680 -3.318 3.169 9.622 19.826 
ZA Win NO 54 5.436 4.704 -3.318 2.944 8.925 19.826 
ZA Win SE 54 7.425 6.403 -3.318 3.693 11.543 19.826 
Table 9: Altman Z-scores 
Table 10 presents summary statistics of the Taffler Z-scores for the companies in the sample. 
The average Taffler Z-score for all companies before winsorization is 72.857. After 
winsorization it is 29.042. For Norwegian companies, the average Taffler Z-score before 
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winsorization is -11.075. After winsorization it is 5.700. For Swedish companies, the 
average Taffler Z-score before winsorization is 156.790. After winsorization it is 52.384. 
This illustrates the effect from the outlier values. 
Summary Taffler Z-scores 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pct. (25) Pct. (75) Max 
ZT 108 72.857 377.724 -691.428 -6.142 30.411 2,455.891 
ZT NO 54 -11.075 155.257 -691.428 -10.639 11.521 648.006 
ZT SE 54 156.790 499.582 -97.448 0.399 52.628 2,455.891 
ZT Win  108 29.042 97.039 -76.882 -6.142 30.411 380.071 
ZT Win NO 54 5.700 63.913 -76.882 -10.639 11.521 380.071 
ZT Win SE 54 52.384 117.540 -76.882 0.399 52.628 380.071 
Table 10: Taffler Z-scores 
4.4.3 Credit risk premiums 
Table 11 presents the interest rates and credit risk premiums for the companies in the sample. 
The average interest rate for all companies is 9.5%. The average interest rate is equal in both 
Norway and Sweden. After adjusting for the five-year treasury bond yield, the credit risk 
premiums are calculated. The average credit risk premium for all companies is 9.0%. For 
Norwegian companies, the average credit risk premium is 8.4%, and for Swedish companies 
the average credit risk premium is 9.7%. The reason why the average credit risk premium for 
Norwegian companies is lower than the average interest rate is that the Norwegian treasury 
bond yield for the respective time periods is positive on average. The opposite is the case in 
Sweden, where treasury bond yields have been negative in the respective time periods. 
Summary of credit risk premiums 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pct. (25) Pct. (75) Max 
Interest rate 108 0.095 0.014 0.060 0.090 0.100 0.140 
Interest rate NO 54 0.095 0.013 0.064 0.088 0.100 0.130 
Interest rate SE 54 0.095 0.015 0.060 0.090 0.100 0.140 
Credit risk premium 108 0.090 0.015 0.058 0.080 0.101 0.144 
Credit risk premium NO 54 0.084 0.013 0.058 0.075 0.089 0.124 
Credit risk premium SE 54 0.097 0.015 0.064 0.090 0.104 0.144 
Table 11: Credit risk premiums 
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5. Empirical results 
In this chapter the empirical results from the analysis will be described. The first subchapter 
presents the results from the regression models we have estimated. The second subchapter 
provides a summary of the results. 
5.1 Regression results 
The results from the estimated OLS regression models presented below are divided into 
three categories by their respective dependent variables. The first category includes models 
with Altman Z-score as dependent variable. The second category includes models with 
Taffler Z-score as dependent variable. The third and last subchapter includes models with 
credit risk premium as dependent variable. All tables report standard errors clustered by 
year. The same estimations with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in 
Appendix A 3. 
5.1.1 Regression with Altman Z-score as dependent variable 
Table 12 presents the outcomes from the regression models (1) through (8) which all use the 
Altman Z-score as dependent variable. The eight models included in the table are divided 
into four pairs where the first model in each pair is estimated on the unwinsorized Altman Z-
score, while the second model is estimated on the winsorized Altman Z-score. Thus, model 
(1), (3), (5), and (7) are estimated on unwinsorized Z-scores, and model (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
are estimated on winsorized Z-scores.  
Model (1) and (2) includes only the “Treated” dummy as independent variable, which is 
equal to 1 if the company is Swedish and 0 if the company is Norwegian. This implies that 
these models do not control further for company characteristics. This is reasonable, assuming 
that the matching applied in the pre-processing of data has ensured sufficient balance in the 
dataset. However, in order to illustrate the effect of controlling further for the coarsened 
variables “Age” and “Size”, these are included in different combinations in models (3) 
through (8). Model (3) and (4) includes the “Age” variable in addition to “Treated”. Model 
(5) and (6) includes the log of Total capital in addition to “Treated”. Model (7) and (8) 
includes both “Age” and log of total capital in addition to “Treated”.  
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Table 12: Altman Z-score regressions with clustered standard errors
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The coefficient for the “Treated” variable is positive and significant at a 5% significance 
level in all estimated models, except for model (4) which is significant at a 10% significance 
level. The estimated coefficients range from 7.84 to 8.64 for the unwinsorized models (1), 
(3), (5), and (7). For the winsorized models (2), (4), (6), and (8) the estimated coefficients 
range from 1.87 to 1.99. The R2 is very low for all models and ranges from 0.031 to 0.10 
across all models. Further, the control variables “Age” and log of Total Capital are non-
significant across all models, except in model (4) where “Age” is significant at a 10% 
significance level. The constant term is significant at a 1% significance level in model (2) 
and (4). 
5.1.2 Regression with Taffler Z-score as dependent variable 
Table 13 is structured similarly to the previous table displaying results from the Altman Z-
score regressions. Models (9) through (16) all use the Taffler Z-score as dependent variable. 
The eight models included in the table are divided into four pairs where the first model in 
each pair is estimated on the unwinsorized Taffler Z-score, while the second model is 
estimated on the winsorized Taffler Z-score. Thus, model (9), (11), (13), and (15) are 
estimated on unwinsorized Z-scores, and model (10), (12), (14), and (16) are estimated on 
winsorized Z-scores.  
As in the previous table displaying results from the Altman Z-score regressions, the two first 
models (9) and (10) only includes the “Treated” dummy as independent variable. Again, in 
order to illustrate the effect of controlling further for the coarsened variables “Age” and 
“Size”, these are included in different combinations in models (11) through (16). Model (11) 
and (12) includes the “Age” variable in addition to “Treated”. Model (13) and (14) includes 
the log of Total capital in addition to “Treated”. Model (15) and (16) includes both “Age” 
and log of total capital in addition to “Treated”. 
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Table 13: Taffler Z-score regressions with clustered standard errors
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The coefficient for the “Treated” variable is positive and significant at a 5% significance 
level in all models estimated on the winsorized Taffler Z-score. Among the models estimated 
on the unwinsorized Taffler Z-score, the coefficient for the “Treated” variable is significant 
at a 10% level in model (9), (11), and (15). In model (13) the estimated coefficient for the 
“Treated” variable has a P-level slightly above 10%. The estimated coefficients for the 
“Treated” variable range from 162.31 to 167.86 for the unwinsorized models ((9), (11), (13), 
and (15). For the winsorized models (10), (12), (14), and (16) the estimated coefficients on 
the “Treated” variable range from 45.24 to 46.68. As in the Altman-regressions, the R2 is 
also very low for all models and ranges from 0.050 to 0.082 across all models. The constant 
term is only significant in model (13) at a 10% significance level. 
5.1.3 Regression with credit risk premium as dependent variable 
Table 14 presents the outcomes from regression models (17) through (20) which all use the 
credit risk premium as dependent variable. The four models in the table include different 
combinations of control variables. Model (17) only includes the “Treated” dummy as 
independent variable. Hence, this model does not control further for company characteristics. 
Model (18) includes the “Age” variable in addition to “Treated”. Model (19) includes the log 
of Total Capital in addition to “Treated”. Model (20) includes both “Age” and log of Total 
Capital in addition to “Treated”.  
The coefficient for the “Treated” variable is positive and significant at a 1% significance 
level across all models. The estimated coefficient is equal in all the models at 0.0126. This 
suggests that loans issued through Swedish crowdlending platforms offer 126 basis points 
higher credit risk premiums than loans issued through Norwegian platforms. R2 is relatively 
low and ranges from 0.172 to 0.173 across all models. This indicates that controlling for age 
and for size only captures negligible more of the variation in credit risk premiums. This is 
further substantiated by the fact that none of the coefficients on the control variables are 
significant in any of the models. Furthermore, the intercept is significant at a 1% level in all 
models, and the coefficients range from 0.0817 to 0.0841. 
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Table 14: Credit risk premium regressions with clustered standard errors
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5.2 Summary of results 
The following subchapter presents a summary of the main results from the empirical 
analysis. 
5.2.1 Significantly better credit quality among Swedish borrowers 
The empirical analysis presented in subchapters 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 shows that companies 
receiving funding through Swedish crowdlending platforms have significantly higher credit 
quality than comparable companies receiving funding through Norwegian crowdlending 
platforms. The results are consistent across a wide range of different model specifications.  
A total of 16 regression models were estimated, of which eight used winsorized Z-scores and 
eight used unwinsorized Z-scores. All models resulted in positive coefficients for the 
variable of interest: The “Treated” variable. The positive coefficients were significant at 5% 
significance level in 11 of the models, and at 10% in four models. In model (13) the 
coefficient had a P-value of 10.02%.  
The R2-measure was low across all models. This suggests that the estimates should not be 
used for prediction purposes. However, the direction of the estimates is still significant. 
Thus, although the analysis cannot provide efficient predictions for how much better credit 
quality the Swedish companies have, it still provides insight through the direction of the 
estimates. 
5.2.2 Significantly better credit risk premiums for Swedish loans 
The empirical analysis presented in subchapter 5.1.3 indicates that credit risk premiums, 
measured as interest rate minus the risk-free interest rate, is significantly higher in Sweden 
than in Norway. A total of four regression models were estimated. The results are consistent 
across all models. They show that credit risk premiums on loans issued through Swedish 
crowdlending platforms are significantly higher than in Norway. Further, the R2 is low 
across all models. This suggests that the estimate should not be used for prediction purposes. 
However, the direction of the estimates is still significant. Thus, although the analysis cannot 
provide reliable estimates for how much higher credit risk premiums are on loans issued 




The findings from the empirical analysis demonstrate that there is both significantly higher 
credit quality and higher credit risk premiums in Sweden compared to Norway. This is an 
anomaly to standard economic theory, which states that loans issued to companies with 
relatively poorer credit quality should yield a corresponding higher credit risk premium. In 
this chapter, we will first discuss reasons for why the credit quality differs cross-border. 
Thereafter, we will discuss reasons for why credit risk premiums in Norway are lower than 
in Sweden. 
6.1 Reasons for differences in credit quality 
One potential factor that could explain the difference in credit quality is related to the use of 
collaterals in crowdlending. The overall risk of any given loan is a function of the risk of 
default and the loss given default (Kagan, 2021). In the analysis, credit quality is expressed 
by the Z-score which is a measure approximating the risk of default. It does not encompass 
any information on the loss given default. Thus, it is possible that the difference in credit 
quality is a result of different levels of collaterals in Norway and Sweden. As it was not 
possible to quantify the loss given default in Norway and Sweden due to incomplete 
information on collaterals, the analysis can neither confirm nor discard this possibility. 
Nevertheless, we argue that it is unlikely that this is the case. The reason for this is that 
Norwegian platforms are required to use debt collection partners in the event of default as 
mentioned in chapter 2.3. Debt collection partners charge between 10% and 20% of the 
recovered amount. Thus, investors in Norwegian loans will only receive between 80% and 
90% of the principal even in the event of full recovery. This implies that Swedish loans only 
need collaterals of between 80% and 90% of a comparable Norwegian loan to have the same 
loss given default. This means that Swedish loans may have lower levels of collaterals, and 
still have the same loss given default as in Norway. This important regulatory difference 
makes it unlikely that the explanation for the difference in credit quality is related to the use 
of collaterals. 
Another potential factor that could explain the difference in credit quality is related to 
regulations. As previously mentioned in chapter 2.3.1.1, Norwegian investors are currently 
only allowed to invest NOK 1 million per year in crowdlending, while Swedish investors do 
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not have the same limitation. This limit may affect the type of investors that find 
crowdlending investments attractive. Many professional investors and financial institutions 
might consider crowdlending as unattractive. The reason for this is that professional 
investors with abundant assets under management will spend a lot of time analyzing their 
investments carefully, and thus want to invest higher amounts than NOK 1 million per year. 
Consequently, this limitation is in practice excluding professional investors from investing in 
crowdlending in Norway. The absence of professional investors in crowdlending may impact 
the credit quality. Professional investors will perform their own credit assessments of the 
companies borrowing through crowdlending. This will set higher demands on the 
crowdlending platforms to conduct proper due diligence and offer quality loans, which will 
improve the credit quality. Many platforms even offer loans with a guarantee of 100% 
subscription offered by professional investors (Kameo, 2021). Such guarantee would not 
have been possible to offer without professional investors’ confidence in the platforms’ 
credit assessment. 
The investment limit of NOK 1 million is intended to ensure high investor protection. In 
practice, the limit excludes professional investors from investing in the market. This leads to 
less stringent assessment of companies borrowing through crowdlending. Less stringent 
assessment of companies means that more companies with poor credit quality can issue 
loans. In practice, the limit is thus reducing investor protection, contrary to its original 
intention. The new EU regulation also aims to protect the investors, but the regulation 
distinguishes between sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors, where special emphasis 
is placed on the non-sophisticated investors understanding the risk of the investment. 
Although the investment limit of NOK 1 million is meant to protect investors, the protection 
may be even better if crowdlending also attracts professional investors. The fact that the 
credit quality of companies borrowing through crowdlending in Sweden are better than in 
Norway, substantiates this.  
In conclusion, it is our view that the difference in credit quality is a result of the current 
regulations. The investment limit of NOK 1 million per year excludes professional investors 
from investing in crowdlending. This limit makes it uninteresting for professional investors 
to invest in the Norwegian crowdlending market. This leaves the market dominated by retail 
investors who do not require as stringent credit assessments as professional investors. The 
outcome is that loans are subscribed even though the credit quality is poorer. 
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6.2 Possible mispricing of risk 
Standard economic theory states that loans issued to companies with relatively poor credit 
quality should yield a corresponding higher credit risk premium. The fact that loans issued 
through Swedish crowdlending platforms have better credit quality and higher credit risk 
premiums thus constitute an anomaly. In the previous chapter we established that a likely 
reason for the relatively poorer credit quality in Norway compared to Sweden, is due to the 
current regulations. The investment limit of NOK 1 million excludes professional investors 
from investing in crowdlending. This leaves the market dominated by retail investors. Retail 
investors do not have the same prerequisites to understand and price risk as professional 
investors and financial institutions. This could explain the potential mispricing.  
In conclusion, it is our view that the anomaly mispricing is a result of the current regulation, 
as it excludes professional investors from investing in crowdlending. This leaves the market 
dominated by retail investors who do not know how to properly price risk. 
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7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following two research questions:  
(1)  
“Are there any differences in credit quality between Norwegian and Swedish companies 
receiving funding through crowdlending?” 
(2)  
“Are there any differences in credit risk premiums on loans issued to comparable 
Norwegian and Swedish companies through crowdlending?” 
To answer the research questions, we constructed a dataset containing information about 
companies that have received funding through Norwegian and Swedish crowdlending 
platforms in the period from 2017 through 2020. Observations from each country were 
matched using CEM in order to reduce model dependence and bias. Thereafter, we 
approximated each company’s credit quality by computing its Z-score in line with Altman 
(1983) and Taffler (1983) bankruptcy prediction models. To adjust for outlier Z-scores, we 
applied 10% winsorization. In addition, the credit risk premium for each loan was computed. 
A total of 20 uni- and multivariate OLS regression models with different control variables 
were estimated. These established the relationship between winsorized and unwinsorized Z-
scores and country of issuance, and between credit risk premium and country of issuance.  
The empirical results show that the credit quality of companies receiving funding through 
Swedish crowdlending platforms has been significantly higher than for their Norwegian 
counterparts. They further show that credit risk premiums for loans issued through Swedish 
crowdlending platforms have been significantly higher than their Norwegian counterparts. 
These empirical results are consistent across all models. This concludes the two research 
questions.  
In the discussion, we argue that the main reason explaining the relatively poorer credit 
quality in Norway than in Sweden is due to the current regulations. Specifically, we point at 
the peculiar Norwegian investment limit of NOK 1 million per year. This limit makes it 
uninteresting for professional investors to invest in the Norwegian crowdlending market. 
Since the market is dominated by retail investors who do not require as stringent credit 
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assessments as professional investors, the loans are subscribed even though the credit quality 
is poorer. 
The analysis shows that the credit risk premiums in Norway are lower than in Sweden, 
although the credit quality is poorer. This is an anomaly to standard economic theory which 
states that loans issued to companies with relatively poorer credit quality should yield a 
corresponding higher credit risk premium. In the discussion, we argue that this anomaly 
could be explained by the fact that the Norwegian market is dominated by retail investors 
without the ability to properly price risk. 
Crowdlending is still an emerging form of financing. Further research on the subject is 
therefore necessary for the development of the industry. As future research will have access 
to data from a longer history of crowdlending in Norway and Sweden, both under the current 
and future regulations, it will be possible to use a difference-in-differences approach for 
isolating various effects. However, as the current Norwegian regulations have not yet been 
changed, such an approach is not possible at this time. One aspect that will be interesting to 
analyze is the impact from the new EU regulation which will be implemented. 
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8. Limitations 
The analysis in this thesis is dependent on the sample data that is used in the analysis. 
Consequently, both the size and the quality of the sample are potential limitations to the 
results of the analysis. It is therefore important to assess these characteristics critically.  
The size of the sample used in the analysis was primarily limited by three factors. The first 
factor limiting the size of the sample is related to the short active history of crowdlending in 
Norway and Sweden as mentioned in chapter 2.3. The short,  active history implies that few 
companies have engaged in crowdlending activities. This is inherently limiting the number 
of loans and companies that can be analyzed. The only way to increase the bound from this 
limitation is to wait. However, it is our opinion that an empirical analysis of the Norwegian 
and Swedish crowdlending market offer valuable insights although the historic data is 
limited.  
The second factor limiting the size of the sample is related to access to data as described in 
chapter 4.1. Two out of the six identified relevant crowdlending platforms refused to share 
information about previously issued loans. This prevented us from compiling a completely 
exhaustive dataset of all loans issued in both countries. It is possible that these platforms 
have issued loans to companies with either credit quality that on average differs from the 
companies we have observed. Although this constitutes a potential source of bias, we have 
not found any reliable information indicating that the platforms have different credit policy 
than their peers. In our opinion this limiting factor therefore does not prevent our study from 
providing valid results.  
The third factor limiting the size of the sample is related to the choice of applying CEM in 
the pre-processing of data. As described in chapter 4.2, this reduced the sample size from 
246 to 108 companies. Simultaneously, it also reduced the sample imbalance considerably 
from an L1 measure of 0.613 pre-matching to 0.259 post-matching. Thus, the sample used in 
the analysis suffers from considerably less model dependence and bias than it would have 
without matching. This is in line with both Iacus et. al. (2012) and King and Nielsen (2019). 
It is therefore our view that the decision of applying CEM was reasonable.  
Further, the quality of the sample is potentially limited by two factors. The first factor 
potentially limiting the quality of the sample is related to the data collection process. As no 
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comprehensive database with data on companies receiving funding through crowdlending in 
neither Norway nor Sweden exists, we were forced to collect the data ourselves. The quality 
of the data is therefore limited by the variety of sources we have used, as described in 
chapter 4.1. Crowdlending platforms could for example potentially have deleted or hidden 
selected loans from their datasets in order to give an impression of superior performance. 
However, data manipulation such as this is close to impossible to identify. Thus, in our view 
it is not reasonable to assume that this is the case.  
The second factor potentially limiting the quality of the sample is related to the financial data 
our analysis is based upon. Many of the companies in our sample are exempt from 
mandatory audit of financial statements due to small size. Appendix A 2 presents an 
overview of the fraction of companies that fall into this category. For these companies, the 
management and board of directors are the only guarantors for the reliability of the financial 
statements. It is therefore possible that financial statements used in the analysis could include 
misreporting due to errors in the accounting. In the worst cases financial statements could 
include straight out manipulated data. However, this is a risk suffered from everyone 
analyzing publicly available financial data from SMEs. In our opinion the value from the 
analysis outweighs the risk of misreported data.  
Based on this discussion, we are of the opinion that the sample used in the analysis has 
sufficient size and quality.
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Appendix 
A  1 Debt collection partner 
Norwegian crowdlending platforms are required to use a debt collection partner in the event 
of default. This partner requires a share of the amount collected. The share depends on which 
risk class the loan belongs to. Figure 3 below shows the debt collection partner’s share of 
recovered amount for the Norwegian platforms.  
 




A  2 Audit obligation 
As a general rule, companies in Norway and Sweden are subject to an audit obligation. 
However, there are exceptions to this rule. In Norway, companies that meet the following 
requirements are not obligated to be audited: (1) Less than NOK 6 million in revenue, (2) 
Less than ten man-years, and (3) Less than NOK 23 million of total capital (Lovdata, 2011; 
Lovdata, 2018). In Sweden, companies that meet the following requirements are not 
obligated to be audited: (1) Less than SEK 3 million in revenue, (2) Less than three man-
years, and (3) Less than SEK 1.5 million in total capital (Riksdagen, 1999). 
 
Figure 4: Share of companies subject to mandatory auditing 
A  3 Regression models with heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors 
In the main analysis we report standard errors clustered by the year-level. The tables below 
present the same models as in the main analysis only with heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors (HC3).  
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Table 15: Altman Z-score regressions with heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
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Table 16: Taffler Z-score regressions with heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
Appendix   57 
 
 
Table 17: Credit risk premium regressions with heteroskedastic robust standard errors
